In which theoretical threads and intellectual eddies, are clarified, commended, and excoriated?
2.1Introduction: A Narratively Informed Literature Review
This chapter presents a narratively informed literature review. It is a mapping of an intellectual journey as it unfolds in relation to practice moving beyond a categorical survey of a given discrete sub-field. The work is led by design and ranges widely in its service, engaging with neurodivergence, mindset, learner autonomy, creativity, cybernetics, and extended cognition. Rather than attempting exhaustive coverage within bounded domains, this review draws on traditions that understand knowledge as situated, relational, and constituted across disciplines (Haraway, 1988; Nicolescu, 2002).
This orientation to literature is necessary. The diversity of fields engaged reflects the nature of the problem itself, which spans cognitive, social, technological, and educational dimensions, and cannot be adequately addressed from within a single discipline. This research begins with a gap in practice rather than a gap in the literature: the challenge of designing meaningful encounters for neurodivergent youth. Literature is engaged in response to that gap, sharpening what might be possible within practice rather than representing whole fields. Most of all, I was trying to understand how to create the conditions for mindset shift in relation to the specific needs and strengths of neurodivergent learners. An awareness that these needs are mutual, held on both sides of the communication gap rather than owed by one side to the other, can begin to bring down the barriers that prevent neurodivergent learners from being in and part of the world.
In this sense, the review operates as a recursive conversation between practice and theory. The practice-informed design activities surface questions, tensions, and possibilities; literature is then drawn in to help interpret, extend, or reframe what is occurring; and these insights are returned to practice for further iteration. Theory is actively sought, selected, and recomposed in relation to the needs of the work as it unfolds. I describe this as a practice-informed, design-led synthesis.
This mode of inquiry is necessary because of its epistemic alignment with a neurodivergent orientation to knowledge: one that is associative, pattern-based, and oriented toward connecting ideas across domains (Taylor & Vestergaard, 2022). The movement across disparate fields, the rapid engagement with emerging concepts, and the emphasis on synthesis over specialisation is a way of knowing that is particularly suited to the design of novel encounters. This approach is grounded in my lived experience as a neurodivergent practitioner-researcher, shaped by Dyslexia, Dyspraxia, Dysgraphia and ADHD (try writing and spelling those on forms quickly!), where iterative, connective, and practice-led sense-making operates not as a workaround, but as a form of expertise. The methodology models the same strengths-based orientation that underpins the research. What may appear as breadth is, in fact, an alignment between the complexity of the problem, the demands of practice-informed research, and my mode of sense-making that is iterative, relational, and generative.
This chapter reflects the concepts and theories that became active in the design of encounters, shaping decisions, being tested through use, and evolving in response. Rigour is therefore located in the clarity of selection, the coherence of composition, and the extent to which these ideas generate and are grounded in practice.
One way to visualise this is as scooping a glass of water from the ocean. The intention is not to account for the totality of the sea through this small sub-sample, but to examine how particular currents, when brought together, behave and interact in each context and moment in time. The chapter is structured as a series of questions: those that emerged as necessary to move the work forward. Each section assembles theory in response, tracing how ideas converge, diverge, and become operational in practice.
My colleague and graduate supervisor Kate Coleman once posed a question that has stayed with me: if you were to invite all the thinkers who have shaped your research to a dinner party, who would be there? Around this table sit contributors from disability and crip theory, learning theory and neurodiversity research, cybernetics, extended cognition, and creative practice. The value of this gathering lies in the generative tensions and alignments that emerge when these perspectives are brought into relation around the experience of the neurodivergent learner.
In dialogue with these thinking friends, I arrive at several core arguments that thread through this chapter: that neurodivergence is best understood through a social model that locates barriers in systems rather than individuals; that cognition extends beyond the skull into instruments, environments, and relationships; that transformation requires new knowledge, shifts in self-perception; and that design practice, when oriented toward strengths and co-learning, can create the conditions for such shifts.
Running beneath these is a narrative orientation that the chapter inhabits: a questioning of the supremacy of deficit language, and the slow work of assembling a more fruitful perspective from which to live a neurodivergent life. These arguments emerge from the friction and resonance between theory and the demands of practice.
2.2Dis/ability & Neurodiversity: A Foundational Re-framing
2.2.1Prevailing discourses around disability?
The prevailing discourse surrounding disability is shaped by complex interplay of social, medical, and psychological constructs, primarily framed within two dominant models: the medical model and the social model. This research fundamentally rejects the medical model and broadly accepts the social model, while holding some critiques of the latter. Separating impairment from the concept of disability, as some strong social-model positions do, can result in the model not fully engaging with the impact of disability on lived experience (Palmer & Harley, 2012). This research seeks to respond to that oversight by incorporating lived experience directly into the design of its workshops and creative outputs, particularly in the context of education, where the mismatch between neurodivergent learners and neurotypical institutions produces friction that cannot be resolved by naming social barriers alone.
The medical model conceptualises disability as a biological phenomenon marked by impairments or deficiencies in function, thereby vesting cognitive authority in the hands of medical professionals and scientists (Haegele & Hodge, 2016). Diagnostic frameworks such as the DSM-5 exemplify this: they categorise neurodivergent variation as “neurodevelopmental... disorders,” a deficit-focused terminology that fails to capture how neurodivergent people actually live, and one that remains historically biased and unfit for diverse populations (Chapman, 2021; Attoe & Climie, 2023; Loomes et al., 2017). In contrast, the social model, first articulated by disability rights activists such as the Union of the Physically Impaired Against Segregation (UPIAS, 1976) and formalised by Mike Oliver (1983, 1990), argues that while impairment may be real, disability is the product of social, environmental, and attitudinal barriers that exclude people with impairments from full participation. Here, the cognitive authority is reallocated to the individuals with impairments, situating them as the primary interpreters of their experiences (Haegele & Hodge, 2016).
Within this dichotomy, scholars such as Dan Goodley forcefully advocate for a paradigmatic shift towards a strengths-based perspective. Moving away from the pathologising tendencies inherent in the medical model, Goodley posits that societal structures, rather than individual limitations, function as the primary agents of disability. Throughout my life and through my practice I have witnessed these structures systematically marginalise individuals with diverse abilities and capacities (Goodley, 1997, 2014, 2016, 2021).
Furthermore, a nuanced understanding of disability necessitates an examination of the ongoing social pressures of ableism and disablism. Ableism promotes the formation of societal norms based on an idealised version of human function, often predicated on at least average capacities across various domains. On the other hand, disablism engenders stigmas and systematically disadvantages those who do not conform to societal expectations of function and ability. Goodley suggests that these two forces should be studied in tandem to understand the complexity of the lived experience of being neurodivergent (Goodley, 2014; Haegele & Hodge, 2016).
Crip theory extends this analysis further, reclaiming the term “crip” as a non-compliant, anti-assimilationist position that insists disability is a desirable part of the world, as Alison Kafer (2013) argues. Kafer’s concept of crip time challenges normative expectations of pace and productivity, arguing that rather than bending disabled bodies and minds to meet the clock, we should bend the clock to meet them. This reimagining of temporality has particular resonance for neurodivergent learners, for whom the pace and sequencing of conventional education is often a source of friction and exclusion. Aimi Hamraie and Kelly Fritsch (2019) build on this in their Crip Technoscience Manifesto, which positions disabled people as effective agents of world-building through practices of critique, alteration, and reinvention, and frames interdependence, rather than independence, as a political technology.
2.2.2What is neurodiversity and the neurodiverse lived experience?
The differences in cognition between a neurotypical learner, a neurodivergent learner, and between different neurodivergent learners ourselves are varied and never unequivocally a benefit or a loss to the learner. Rather, these unique and interrelated subjective experiential frames are inextricably linked with the personality and identity of each learner and inform how they experience life (Griffin & Pollak, 2009; Singer, 2017). The frame of neurodiversity argues that the strengths and weaknesses of neurodivergent learners are interrelated and bound to a collective self that interacts with an, at times, hostile world (Corker & French, 1999). This broad movement advocates for the rights of non-neurotypical people (Milton, 2020) and seeks to change social norms and endeavours to respond to the unique traits and values of neurodivergent people.
Many design decisions sit downstream of where disability is located. If the deficit lives inside the person, as the medical model holds, then an intuitive response is remediation, with a workshop as a new form of treatment. If instead the disabling lives in the arrangement between person and world, as the social model insists, which Dan Goodley (2014) would call dis/ability, then the response is redesign, and a workshop becomes a site where learners and their environments can be renegotiated together. Goodley’s notation holds both terms in tension, recognising that disability and ability are co-constituted by social, cultural, and political forces rather than neutral norms. The social model returns interpretive authority to those with lived experience. A strengths-based perspective (Armstrong, 2012; Chapman & Botha, 2023) replaces the ineffectual intent of a deficit frame to produce change while still acknowledging the peaks and troughs of cognition are inseparable and can be attended to together. Crip theory continues to directly advocate for power and action, refusing assimilation and positioning neurodivergent and disabled communities as agents of world-building rather than recipients of accommodation (Kafer, 2013; Hamraie & Fritsch, 2019). Braided together, these threads centre power and action in neurodivergent communities themselves.
For neurodivergent learners, navigating educational environments designed around neurotypical assumptions can be a source of persistent friction, from the pace and sequencing of curricula to the formats in which knowledge is assessed (Hamilton & Petty, 2023; Tcherdakoff, Marshall, et al., 2025; Tcherdakoff, Stangroome, et al., 2025). This friction is a social structure that compounds over time, shaping academic outcomes, self-perception and wellbeing, as learners expend invisible labour conforming to norms that were never designed for them (Syharat et al., 2023).
The experience of neurodivergence can range enormously and can include lack of socio-emotional reciprocity (American Psychiatric Association, 2013), increased capacity for intellectual inquiry and the objective measurement of phenomena (Silberman, 2015), altered or diminished executive function and language decoding like reading and spelling (Peterson & Pennington, 2012) and inattentiveness (Faraone et al., 2021). It is important to note that literature will often explore either the strengths or the weaknesses of neurodivergence but seldom the relationship between the varied parts of the neurodivergent experience in spite of the difficulty of demonstrating the neurological distinction between medical diagnoses of neurodivergence and more general difficulties (Elliott & Gibbs, 2008). Nancy Doyle (2020) offers one way to hold these together: reframing these conditions as neurominorities with “spiky profiles,” in which specific difficulties sit alongside neurocognitive strengths within the same person, calling for functional, strengths-based frameworks rather than deficit-only diagnostic ones.
2.2.3What are the barriers that limit neurodiverse learners’ access to support?
Two further dynamics compound these barriers. The friction between autistic and non-autistic social actors is commonly read as a one-way deficit; Damian Milton’s (2012) double empathy problem reframes it as a mutual barrier between communities of varied cognition, where a learner’s needs cannot be reliably read from the outside. Institutions compound this: schooling, as Ivan Illich (1970) argued, trains compliance with norms and procedures, and that training carries particular weight for neurodivergent learners, whose masking is an outgrowth of institutional pressure rather than an inherent feature of their cognition. Naming these barriers is also an argument for redesign: increased autonomy and agency arrive with the ability to genuinely choose the extent of one’s compliance with norms. Diagnostic gatekeeping restricts the capacity for self-affiliation with neurodivergent labels, thereby hindering access to institutional resources, validation, and socio-economic support (Elliott, 2020).
The traits of the neurodivergent experience may be obfuscated through various modalities: either as twice-exceptional learners (Reis et al., 2014), via adaptive coping mechanisms that mitigate perceived deficits, or through the presence of comorbid conditions that mask behaviours and challenge standard clinical diagnostic paradigms, for example ADHD coexisting with Autism. Fifty percent of students with one learning difficulty have another, and some argue that discrete categories of diagnosis do not even exist, and instead sit along a spectrum (Kaplan et al., 2001). Intersectional variables such as gender (Fusar-Poli et al., 2022), economic standing, educational context, cultural and linguistic diversity (Schmengler et al., 2021), lower socio-economic status, and geographical accessibility to resources (Chen et al., 2007) further contribute to the under-recognition of learners who could otherwise benefit from understanding and support. Even intersectional and complex instances of neurodivergent lived experience have been responsive to technological interventions (Rizza, 2006).
2.2.4How does advocating a social and evolutionary view change the frame?
The theory of complementary cognition proposed by Helen Taylor, Brice Fernandes and Sarah Wraight (2022) holds that neurocognitive diversity is not an unintended side effect of human development but a necessary component of it. Taylor and colleagues argue that our species cooperatively adapts through a system of group-level cognition, where individuals specialise in different modes of cognitive search. Some minds are oriented towards exploration, others towards exploitation, and the interplay between them drives cultural evolution and collective adaptation. In a subsequent paper, Taylor and Martin Vestergaard (2022) apply this framework directly to dyslexia, arguing that people diagnosed with developmental dyslexia are specialised in explorative cognitive search and play an essential role in human adaptation. Neurodiversity, from this evolutionary perspective, is the mechanism by which our species thrives.
And yet, as Goodley (2014, 2016) and others in disability studies have long argued, social norms and institutional structures consistently push people on the peripheries of cognitive bell curves towards conformity. Systems built around an idealised average learner, what Todd Rose (2016) calls the myth of the average, systematically disadvantage those whose cognitive profiles are, in his term, “jagged,” strong in some areas and weak in others. Over time, bureaucracies and educational systems develop an incentive to create structures that speak to the average rather than act in everyone’s best interest. For neurodivergent learners like myself and my research participants, this produces a cruel tension: the very cognitive variation that Taylor’s evolutionary account reveals as essential is flattened by systems that were never designed to accommodate it.
2.2.5In what way is neurodiversity a political act?
In contorting discourses of neurodiversity around reaction and resistance to medicalised stigmas of the neurodivergent experience, as predictably as a metronome swing, discussion turns towards a more social perception of disability. What we miss here is a third axis to consider: disability as a political act and neurodivergent communities as political forces. Crip theorists have long insisted on this political dimension, positioning disabled people not as subjects of policy but as agents of world-building whose non-compliance with normative expectations is itself a form of political action (Kafer, 2013; Hamraie & Fritsch, 2019). Ari Ne’eman and Elizabeth Pellicano (2022) frame neurodiversity explicitly as politics, while Timothy Beck (2024) argues that neurodivergent identity is produced through processes of disidentification with mainstream cultural norms under neoliberal capitalism, rather than identification with a particular social category. Peter Sedgwick explored the political economy of mental health, in Psycho Politics (1982), arguing that the accidents of heredity and the blows of the environment do not add up into the social position and personal identity of being mentally ill. This logic when applied to neurodiversity shows that neurodivergence can be as much a political, as a medical, designation. It is a category that has been created by those who wish to distribute resources, and it therefore demands of neurodivergent learners themselves, and of our discourses around them, a consideration of the wider political economy of neurodivergent minds in a neoliberal, market-driven world (Walters, 2025).
So how do we avoid a system-wide critique that limits the remaining agency that the individual has? When Byung-Chul Han published Psychopolitics: Neoliberalism and New Technologies of Power (2017), he explored how neoliberal systems create a crisis of freedom in an age of transparency, where Procrustean technologies and increasingly privatised care programs prevent those affected from meeting and organising together. This logic sidesteps any questions about the social causes of distress, or our collective responsibility for alleviating it, and overlooks shared issues such as housing, education, and threats to welfare benefits. When pressuring neurodivergent learners to reach neurotypical normative expectations, we ignore the wider implications and costs of that adherence. These expectations are bound up in neoliberal capitalist notions of performance, with the underlying suggestion that unless you are able to provide excess labour beyond the cost of sustaining yourself, you are not a worthy member of a productive market society (Beck, 2024).
The overarching point is that neurodivergent learners are not outside of a system but rather one part of it, and as a community they have the capacity to act, adapt, respond to, and improve that system as much as any other actor does. We are an interconnected, integrated part of the very thing we are trying to change. The logic of “nothing about us without us” necessitates the community themselves taking some of, but not all of, the responsibility to effect change.
It is important to note that this research in no way seeks to diminish or unreasonably critique the underlying neurochemical, neurological, psychological, and medical realities of living with what is often termed neurodevelopmental learning difficulties. There is substantial evidence that the heritability of various forms of neurodivergence is significant: meta-analytic twin studies estimate the heritability of autism spectrum disorder at 64-91% (Tick et al., 2016), while ADHD heritability is estimated at 64-86% and has remained stable over time despite increasing prevalence (Taylor et al., 2023). These are real neurological differences with a strong genetic basis. Certainly, this is not anti-psychiatry or anti-medical work. Nor do I suggest any discontinuation of prescription medications for the treatment of ADHD. From my research, personal experience, and academic reading, it seems clear to me that the judicious and considered use of stimulant medications, along with other strategies, have enormous potential to be a meaningful and worthwhile tool in navigating the experience of VAST. What this work instead tries to do is question the supremacy of deficit language.
2.2.6What paths are available for neurodivergent learners navigating educational environments?
What the previous sections describe is the system as it appears from above: the discourses, clinical models, and deficit framings through which neurodivergence has historically been narrated. What they do not yet account for is what happens at the level of the learner, in the small, daily mechanics of moving through that system. It is here, at the point where systemic conditions meet individual response, that this research arrives at its own specific site of inquiry.
One of the ways that I have developed to break down the different responses neurodivergent learners can have when navigating educational environments is by distinguishing three paths. This typology is my own. It emerged from years of teaching neurodivergent learners, was clarified through reflection on my own route through formal education as a dyslexic, ADHD student, and has been tested and refined in conversation with students, colleagues, and supervisors across the life of this research.
The first is brute force: what happens when a student is determined to get through a piece of work without any intervention. It is certainly the most painful. It means putting an inordinate amount of time and pressure on yourself to complete work in suboptimal environments. It means spending four hours on an essay when everyone else spent half an hour. It is excruciating, and so often the default.
The second is sidestepping: learning your way around a particular problem. It might be adopting multisensory instruction methods such as the Orton-Gillingham or VAKT approaches when traditional literacy instruction fails (Birsh & Carreker, 2018). It might be executive function coaching, environmental modifications like flexible pacing or reduced sensory input, or changing the type of classes you study and the formats you study them in (Hamilton & Petty, 2023). In other words, sidestepping is to move from one pedagogy into another that conforms more fluidly around your learning style.
The third, and to me the most exciting, is leapfrogging. Is it possible to use some intervention or technology to completely leapfrog the bottleneck and produce a radically more accessible environment? A simple question illustrates this: do you need to be literate to be literary? Using audiobooks, we can reorder the dependencies of literacy, allowing someone to read the great works and indulge in fantastical worlds without relying on their word decoding. In other words, they can read with their ears rather than their eyes.
This research sits in leapfrog territory. While it acknowledges the reality of brute force and the value of sidestepping into alternative pedagogies, it is oriented around the possibility of reordering, sequencing and maximising what the learner has at any given point in time.
2.3Mindset Shift, Learner Autonomy & Change
2.3.1How does a deficit-based mindset diminish learner autonomy, and what would it take to break that cycle?
One of the major barriers in creating change, and that change being transformational and producing learner autonomy, is understanding how mindsets are formed, how they calcify, and how we can help make them shift. This section explores the mechanisms of mindset formation and calcification in neurodivergent learners, examines theories around scaffolding transformational change, and argues for the value of imbuing autonomous thinking into theories of change to increase the mobility of learners who have been locked out of self-determined decision-making. One relevant idea that I will explore later is cognition as ecological, assembled across body, place, tools, and other people, so a learner’s sense of what is possible for them is partly a property of their ecology, and ecologies can be designed (see 2.5.7, Cognition as Ecology). A theory of change, as Carol Weiss (1995) defines it, is a comprehensive description of how and why a desired change is expected to happen in a particular context.
Carol Dweck’s (2017) research on mindset has demonstrated that learners who believe their abilities are fixed tend to avoid challenge, interpret failure as confirmation of inadequacy, and disengage from learning environments that feel threatening. For neurodivergent learners who have been repeatedly measured against neurotypical standards they cannot meet, a fixed, deficit-based mindset can calcify early and deeply. I have experienced this in practice and seen first-hand the impact of learners being told they are broken and that they cannot ever be fixed. After a while, they believe it. Robert Kegan and Lisa Laskow Lahey’s (2009) theory of immunity to change may offer an explanation for why this calcification can be so resistant to intervention: even when learners consciously want to change, competing commitments and hidden assumptions create what amounts to an immune system that protects existing ways of thinking. A neurodivergent learner may genuinely want to adopt new strategies yet simultaneously hold an unexamined belief that they are fundamentally incapable of learning differently. Understanding these mechanisms of formation and resistance is a prerequisite for designing interventions that can meaningfully scaffold change.
There is a vicious cycle at work, from which this project is trying to break out. A negative, deficit-based mindset diminishes learner autonomy, and environments that instil negative mindsets also tend not to allow for autonomy. Richard Ryan and Edward Deci’s (2000, 2017) self-determination theory provides a framework for understanding why this cycle is so damaging: learners have three basic psychological needs, autonomy, competence, and relatedness, and when these are thwarted, the result is a loss of motivation and diminished wellbeing. Autonomy, in this sense, is not only an individual disposition: disability scholarship casts it as a collective, political achievement too, captured in the demand of “nothing about us without us” (Charlton, 1998), and feminist theorists describe it as relational, exercised with and through others rather than in solitary independence (Mackenzie & Stoljar, 2000). For neurodivergent learners, this thwarting is often compounded by rejection sensitivity, where a heightened sensitivity to perceived failure or criticism informs negative self-perception (Sandland, 2025; Bedrossian, 2021). If you are sensitive to rejection and then you feel guilty about being sensitive to rejection, that shame compounds. Over time, this cycle produces learners who have internalised a view of themselves as deficient, who lack the autonomy to advocate for their own needs, and who inhabit environments that confirm and reinforce both conditions.
While autonomy is important for all learners, it is particularly key for neurodivergent learners for two reasons that surface consistently in both the literature and in my own teaching practice. First, they are uniquely placed to know what is going on with themselves. No external framework, however well designed, can match the fidelity of a learner’s own understanding of their cognition once they have the autonomy to develop that understanding. This critically engages with Milton’s (2012) double empathy problem, which reframes the epistemic gap between neurotypical and neurodivergent people as reciprocal rather than one-directional, and with a growing body of neurodivergent-led scholarship that treats lived experience not as anecdotal data but as a form of expertise in its own right (den Houting, 2019; Bertilsdotter Rosqvist et al., 2023).
Second, the needs of each neurodivergent learner are so varied that autonomous decision-making is the only way interventions can be sufficiently granular to be meaningful. Educational policy, by definition, operates beyond the scale of the individual learner’s needs: the variance in the neurodivergent population (Kaplan et al., 2001) makes such abstraction necessarily a dilution of the potential of a learning environment (Clouder et al., 2020). One-size-fits-all approaches leave the burden on neurodivergent students to self-advocate or tolerate inadequately conducive conditions for their learning (Beaux et al., 2024). What is needed instead are alternative methods that position the learner as an active participant in designing their own learning environments. Participatory and co-design approaches, where neurodivergent learners are engaged as co-creators, offer one such alternative (Raman & French, 2022a, 2022b) and are the methodological orientation this research adopts. These approaches can create the conditions for genuine participation through asset-based narratives and multi-modal engagement, producing interventions that respond to the specificity of lived experience rather than the abstraction of policy (Hamilton & Petty, 2023).
Jack Mezirow’s (1997; Mezirow & Taylor, 2009) transformative learning theory argues that critical and autonomous thinking must take precedence over the uncritical assimilation of knowledge, and that transformation requires learners to become aware that there is a need for change before they can begin to enact it. While Mezirow’s ten steps of transformation provide a useful articulation of this process, they are sequential and linear, following a logic that aligns more comfortably with normative educational structures than with the experience of neurodivergent learners, whose processes of change are iterative and non-linear while lurching forward and hanging back in unexpected ways. The transtheoretical model of change (Prochaska & DiClemente, 1983; Raihan & Cogburn, 2025) similarly maps stages from precontemplation through to maintenance, offering a framework for understanding readiness but not the design of conditions that enable it. Lisa Grocott’s (2022) SEED framework, Surfacing, Envisaging, Empowering, and Doing, carries this idea forward into practice-informed research. It shows how a transformative learning environment can be built that operationalises wonder: participants recognise existing knowledge, envision alternative futures, build capacity for action, and translate insight into practice. It is iterative and responsive rather than prescriptive, and it foregrounds the role of design in creating the conditions in which transformation happens. These conditions are not always made up of large, singular exercises or interventions. They are sometimes small, seemingly insignificant moments or actions that can open new possibilities for thinking and acting, what Erin Manning (2016) calls minor gestures. These micro-conditions accumulate and make different orientations thinkable. Mezirow conceived of the disorienting dilemma that triggers transformation as a singular event; for neurodivergent learners the dilemma is a chronic, sustained, accumulating mismatch between the learner and the structures they are expected to navigate.
It is from this lineage that the SEAT framework (Surfacing, Envisaging, Actioning, Togethering) emerges. Developed as part of the creative practice of this PhD, SEAT adapts Grocott’s SEED framework in both structure and goal: it keeps Surfacing and Envisaging, modifies Empowering/Doing into Actioning, and adds Togethering as a novel fourth movement, reflecting this research’s emphasis on collective meaning-making and relational practice. It is also informed by the stages of change in the transtheoretical model and Mezirow’s transformative learning theory and is designed specifically for the neurodivergent context. It provides a scaffold for transformative learning that is playful, pluriversal, and responsive to the learner’s own experience. The framework is discussed in full in Chapter 5, where its development, application, and the insights that emerged from its use are explored in detail.
See the creative artefactThe SEAT framework
Surfacing, Envisaging, Actioning, Togethering: the structuring logic of the Playbook and its workshop builder.
See SEAT in the PlaybookSEAT in actionBuild a workshop with it
2.4Learning and Transformation
2.4.1What learning theories support transformation?
The previous section explored why transformation and autonomy matter for neurodivergent learners, drawing on psychological and motivational literature. This section turns to a parallel but distinct set of questions, rooted in pedagogy and learning theory. What kinds of learning theories, sensibilities, and environments actually encourage transformation rather than compliance? How might these theories interface with an increasingly digitally mediated world and a deeper awareness of the variety of neurodivergent learners’ needs?
The theories engaged within this section are not intended as a comprehensive survey of educational thought. They have been selected because they can be put to work at the scale at which this research operates: the workshop, the exercise, the encounter between learner and instrument, and the digitally mediated environments that connect them. Much of educational theory reinforces the normative structures and vicious cycles already discussed in this chapter. Many of the genuine alternatives to those structures work best at the scale of a whole school or educational system. The theories gathered here are of a different kind. Taken together, they let this research argue that transformative learning for neurodivergent students can be supported by pedagogies that position the learner as an active, relational participant in the world and in their own learning, and that such pedagogies can be designed into the texture of workshop practice rather than requiring whole-institution reform.
Several progressive traditions share sympathies with this research without aligning with it; Table 2.1 names what is shared and where this work parts company.
| Montessori (1967) | Steiner / Waldorf | Freire (1970/2000) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Shared sympathy | Designed environments and exercises that keep self-direction and autonomy intact | Creativity, imagination, embodied learning | Liberatory education; the political force of new experience |
| Where this research parts from it | A whole-school system, most developed for early childhood; this work is with late adolescence and early adulthood | Resistance to technology in learning (Mavrelos & Daradoumis, 2020) against this research’s commitment to digital extension | Does not re-orient around grassroots activism and consciousness-raising |
Lev Vygotsky’s (1978) zone of proximal development describes the space between what a learner can do independently and what they can do with support. It is a productive space, neither so difficult that the learner cannot engage with any level of assistance, nor so easy that they can already do it alone. In order to scaffold learning, this research creates instruments of change, defined at the close of this chapter and shown in context in Chapters 4 and 5. These are tools and creative encounters that operationalise extended cognition, positioning learners into this zone and balancing support and independence. Jean Lave and Étienne Wenger’s (1991) concept of situated learning argues that learning is not an abstract cognitive process but something that happens through participation in the practices of a community. Their subsequent work on communities of practice (Wenger, 1998) extends this, describing how groups of people who share a concern or passion for something learn how to do it better through regular interaction.
The workshops and creative encounters are designed to foster exactly the kind of communities of practice Wenger describes spaces where neurodivergent learners learn with and from one another through shared activity. What gives these communities traction in practice are the artefacts that circulate within them. The exercises, visual metaphors, and toolkits produced through this research function as what Fox (2011), building on Susan Leigh Star and James Griesemer’s (1989) foundational concept, calls boundary objects: entities that have the capacity to enable knowledge, ideas, or outcomes in one domain to translate into knowledge in others. A boundary object might be a workshop exercise, a visual metaphor, or a physical toolkit, something that sits between the learner’s existing understanding and the shifts the research is trying to enable. Nora Bateson’s (2016) work on warm data offers a complementary lens, arguing that the interconnectedness of knowledge across different contexts is itself worthy of study, and that the relational threads between ideas, people, and environments carry meaning that is lost when knowledge is reduced to isolated data points. These relational orientations scale upward in the work of Gert Biesta.
Biesta’s (2021) framing of world-centred education situates the learner in the wider context of the world, enabling students to interact with it without placing themselves at the centre of it. Biesta describes a truly eccentric student as one who accepts they are a part of the world but not the centre of it. He argues that there is a false dichotomy between teacher-centred and student-centred learning, and that attempts to define progressive or conservative education inside those silos are insufficient for truly transformative educational pedagogy. Instead, world-centred education encourages learners to spend time tackling how they can become active participants in the world. Learners are not means to an end, that is, a successful educational system, but rather ends in and of themselves and crucially for themselves. Elsewhere, Biesta (2020) argues that education should be oriented towards three domains of purpose: qualification, socialisation, and subjectification. It is the third of these that most directly concerns this research.
Subjectification has to do with the existence of the student as the subject of their own life, not as an object of educational interventions. When educational systems overvalue qualification at the expense of subjectification, they produce compliant learners rather than free ones. For neurodivergent learners, this imbalance can be particularly damaging, as it reduces the rich complexity of their cognition to a set of measurable outcomes that were never designed to capture what they can do. This research takes Biesta’s world-centred orientation as a starting point and tries to extend it into digitally mediated environments. The argument, developed across the next section, is that world-centred education and post-humanist thought can be productively integrated, so that the world a learner learns in and with includes the digital instruments and extended cognitive environments that make certain forms of learning possible for neurodivergent students at all.
The collaborative and participatory methods used in this research are a pedagogical and political commitment to redistribute who gets to shape the conditions of their own learning. Three thinkers, read together, help make this claim legible. The principles of democratic education, amazingly, from more than a century ago (Dewey, 1916), provide a historical context for why participatory design methods fit effectively inside progressive forms of education, a tradition Sant (2019) shows has since grown to encompass participatory, critical, and agonistic discourses well beyond Dewey’s original liberal framing, and one whose relevance only grows as digital environments diminish the structural forces historically used to justify more hierarchical forms of learning. Dewey (1916) argued that thinking depends on real-life situations and that separating thinking from acting is obsolete: learning is something done in and with the world, not received from above. Alfred Adler’s individual psychology (Ansbacher & Ansbacher, 1956), popularised for a contemporary audience by Ichiro Kishimi and Fumitake Koga (2018), extends this into a theory of human relationships, arguing that healthy development depends on horizontal rather than vertical relationships. Where vertical relationships position one person above another through praise, punishment, or judgement, horizontal relationships are built on mutual respect and shared endeavour. For neurodivergent learners who have spent much of their educational lives positioned beneath neurotypical expectations, horizontal relationships are a structural precondition for the trust this research’s workshops depend on.
bell hooks (1994) extended the democratic tradition further into a feminist and liberatory frame, insisting that the classroom be a space where the lived experience of marginalised learners is centred. Critically, hooks (1994) also argues that a democratic space must acknowledge tensions rather than aspire to what Peter McLaren, critiquing sanitised models of multiculturalism in a related register, describes as “an undisturbed space of harmony and agreement” where social antagonisms are hidden from view (Steinberg, 1992). For hooks, insufficient engagement with the marginalisation and harm that sits outside the classroom, often due to the fact that educators “lacked strategies to deal with antagonisms,” can create “space for disempowered collective backlash,” (hooks, 1994, p. 31) potentially pushing people away from being open to radical paradigm shifts. Spaces for collective discovery and horizontal, democratic learning also involve active labour to navigate and engage with tension and different perspectives. Dewey, Adler, and hooks together underwrite this research’s orientation toward horizontality: as historical grounding, as interpersonal ethic, and as feminist liberatory practice respectively. There is further work to be done on habits of mind and how to encourage such habits around extended cognition (Holdo, 2023; Mezirow & Taylor, 2009), work that this research attempts to contribute to through its creative practice.
Crip theory, introduced earlier in this chapter as a political and philosophical frame, also has significant implications for how learning environments are designed. Kafer’s (2013) concept of crip time not only challenges normative expectations of pace and productivity in the abstract; it directly reshapes how we think about the temporality of learning. Neurodivergent students can experience time differently in educational settings: the rigid temporal frameworks of conventional education can displace the very community time and creative time where the most meaningful learning happens (Smith, 2024). Neurodivergent students are made to feel as though they are falling behind time, wasting time, and losing time, a struggle that compounds harm to their wellbeing, confidence, and sense of self (Edwards & Sudlow-Haylett, 2023). Abrams, Floyd and Abes (2024) argue that crip theory tenets, including fluidity, interdependence, and crip time, can be applied directly to creating accessible academic experiences through co-constructing course access and de-stigmatising non-normative academic timelines. In my own research, the insights of crip space-time surfaced not as an underlying principle I began with but as part of the practice insights that emerged and are described in the fourth and fifth chapters. When these practice insights were analysed, they were discovered to mirror crip theory, for example in an openness around time and rest, with participants taking long, meaningful breaks along with frequent discussions of care and community. Due to these emergent features found in practice this research sits in deep alliance with crip theory.
This work positions itself within the same space, sharing its commitments to making room, making community, and refusing the temporal logics that disable neurodivergent learners. My WonderLab colleague Alison Colwell-Matsuura and their PhD on Soft and Slow Designing (under review) have been an important bridge here. Our ongoing and deep conceptual dialogue around alternative and expansive ways of thinking about creativity, practice, and time has been one I have immensely enjoyed engaging with, and one that, on reflection, felt present in our conversations all along, even before crip theory surfaced explicitly in my understanding of this research.
As we move beyond normative expectations of practice and time, a question emerges: where does this leave us when it comes to interacting with technological systems, and to what extent can learning exist in those systems? Connectivism, introduced by George Siemens (2005), argues that learning in digital environments occurs through interconnected systems where knowledge is passed between different users and digital agents, enabling emergent learning and discoveries through increasingly complex network activity (Siemens, 2005; Siemens & Tittenberger, 2009). The use of connectivism can draw clarity out of fields that historically have worked at cross purposes to one another (Corbett & Spinello, 2020). This approach places a continually changing and diverse community at the centre of learning and links directly with the co-created learning environments that are made as part of this project’s creative workshops. If learning is networked, distributed, and digitally mediated, what is the role of technology in that network, and how do we ensure it serves the learner rather than the other way around?
2.5Technology, Cybernetics, and Extended Cognition
2.5.1Where do we end and the tools we use begin?
In the prologue, I offered this question: where does your mind end and the tools you use begin? If I asked you to document something, I would not be surprised if you used a pencil and paper, or a phone, or a computer to make notes. We wear shoes to modify the terrain we can walk on. We have accepted some technologies, particularly older ones, as extensions of self, and society has adapted and conformed, even its language, to have a more capacious sense of who we are. Few consider a hearing aid to be cheating, or a bicycle a moral blight on those that wish to walk somewhere, or that a meeting never took place because it was a video call rather than in person. There is a long conversation in design and science and technology studies about the politics embedded in artefacts. Langdon Winner (1980) argued that technologies carry politics regardless of the intentions of their makers, and Peter-Paul Verbeek (2005) extended this into a post-phenomenological account of how designed objects actively shape the conditions of human action. The argument I want to make here is a specific instance of that wider claim, applied to the domain of cognitive extension. If a dyslexic learner chooses to read with their ears rather than their eyes, or an ADHD learner uses a tool to help structure their writing, something shifts. An invisible line appears to have been crossed: the line between the particular cognitive extensions we socially accept and those that we do not.
This is extended cognition set out through Clark and Chalmers (1998) meeting the social world, where the coupling of mind and instrument is accepted for some extensions and policed for others. Chapter 4 records how policing arrives in lived experience, where are participants told that an aid was a crutch or that a support would be removed once they were functioning. The responses to this crossing are rarely dramatic, but they accumulate: the suggestion that listening to an audiobook is not really reading, that a spellchecker is a crutch, that extra time in an exam is an unfair advantage. I have received versions of all of these, as a student and later as an educator, and they share one implication, that the assisted or aided version of the activity somehow counts for less. I call this division the tool line: the arbitrary, culturally constructed boundary between the cognitive extensions we accept and those we stigmatise. I do not believe this line has a consistent logic, and I think it moves depending on who is using the tool, what they are using it for, and whether the context demands an adherence to historical ways of demonstrating capacity rather than a determination of outcome. As Chalmers (2018) has argued, asking what an individual can do unaided by the technologies available to them in everyday life is fundamentally an uninteresting question when those resources will always be available. Assistive technology is still too often framed as a problem-solving response to a medical model of disability, pathologising the very people it is supposed to support (S. A. Brown, 2023). McNicholl et al. (2021) argue that harnessing mainstream devices as assistive technology for all students would facilitate inclusion and reduce stigma, suggesting that the tool line could be dissolved entirely if we stopped treating cognitive extension as an accommodation and started treating it as a universal feature of how humans learn. The Crip Technoscience Manifesto (Hamraie & Fritsch, 2019) goes further, positioning disabled people not as passive recipients of assistive technology but as expert designers and hackers of their own tools, whose practices of critique, alteration, and reinvention should be understood as technoscientific activism. This hacking sensibility is what Otto von Busch (2022) calls making trouble: design as material activism, in which remaking a made world that was not designed for your life is itself a form of dissent. The tool line, from this perspective, is politically constructed, and refusing it is an act of self-determination. Part of the same difficulty, in providing tools that help neurodivergent learners meet their goals with greater ease, is determining what those needs actually are. Are they authentic, intrinsic desires that, when met, allow for a more autonomous flourishing? Or, by virtue of growing up with neurotypical expectations placed upon us, are they built first around the desire to survive, to act in compatibilist ways, adhering to potentially problematic and pervasive normative standards? This tension between survival and flourishing, between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, runs through the whole neurodivergent community (Hull et al., 2017; Pearson & Rose, 2021; Syharat et al., 2023). It is also in evidence for me in this work, as I have struggled to navigate the normative expectations I hold for myself while communicating the very frameworks that help neurodivergent learners bypass them. Section 1.2.1 traced how this same tension has shaped my own relationship with scholarly reading, and why this exegesis engages literature the way it does.
2.5.2The Dyslexic Room
The tool line is an abstract claim, and questions of where legitimacy ends are best tested where they live, in intuition. To do that, I want to propose a thought experiment of my own, the Dyslexic Room. Its purpose in this exegesis is specific: it isolates the question this research keeps returning to, whether we value the process by which knowledge is acquired or the fact of its acquisition, and it does so in a form portable enough to be carried into a workshop and handed to a learner. It is based on perhaps the best-known thought experiment in the history of modern computing, the Turing test. Proposed by Alan Turing, this philosophical question asks: is the entity I am interacting with a human or a machine?
It is an intuition pump that blurs the line between real and simulated human cognition by some form of digital agent. It is now widely regarded as having been far surpassed by modern AI chatbots. Within a few years of being proposed, a secondary one by philosopher John Searle called the Chinese Room rendered it largely moot. In the Chinese Room, a question in Mandarin is posted through a door. The person inside shortly posts another letter with the response, again in Mandarin. The question is this: what is the distinction between the mind of a genuine Mandarin speaker and the mind of an English speaker who has an English-to-Mandarin and a Mandarin-to-English dictionary? This question probes at a deep fork in moral philosophy, between consequentialist and deontological ethics. Do the consequences matter, or is the process a moral good in and of itself? Let me posit a different experiment, this time with the dyslexic in the room. A book is posted under the door and after enough time has passed, questions are asked to determine the comprehension of the reader. There is outwardly no distinguishing factor between a book being passed under the door and being read conventionally with your eyes, or transferred to a different medium and read with your ears. The inability to distinguish these two states is a protective veil that prevents the outside observer from knowing, or needing to know, which method was used. If the comprehension is equivalent, the medium of reading becomes irrelevant. The Dyslexic Room collapses the tool line entirely. It reveals that the insistence on a particular method of reading is not a measure of comprehension but a policing of process, a deontological commitment to how knowledge should be acquired rather than a consequentialist interest in whether it was. For neurodivergent learners, this distinction matters enormously. It is the difference between being told you cannot read and being shown that you already can, just with your ears rather than your eyes.
2.5.4Where does the mind stop and the rest of the world begin?
In the year I was born, 1998, Andy Clark and David Chalmers proposed an answer to this question. Their proposal can be summed up simply: “Cognitive processes ain’t (all) in the head!” (Clark & Chalmers, 1998, p. 8). In other words, it is possible for cognition to exist externally to the human, or even as a coupled system that acts in dialogue with a human organism to create a cognitive system in its own right. A year later, Richard Dawkins (1999) released The Extended Phenotype, suggesting an even more axiomatic, evolutionary repackaging of this idea: that the influence of a gene rather than being limited to the cells that hold it or the body that carries it, can extend into environments that it shapes. The dam made by a beaver, for instance, is an extended phenotype programmed into the inherent sensibilities of beavers themselves. Kim Sterelny (2010) pushes this in another direction, highlighting the distinction between minds that are genuinely extended and minds that are scaffolded with environmental supports, suggesting that there is not a binary between inside and outside but rather a set of more varied, more interesting connections.
In the psychological literature, agency is often read as the intentional influence a person exerts over their own functioning and life circumstances (Bandura, 2001), operating from an internal locus of control rather than from externally defined normative standards (Rotter, 1966). This research reads learner agency differently, through its posthuman and extended cognition commitments. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (1987) offer this dissolution with an older, stranger vocabulary: the assemblage, a working arrangement of heterogeneous parts, bodies, tools, signs, spaces, that holds together long enough to do something. In an assemblage, agency is a property of the arrangement; capacities emerge between the parts and belong to no single one of them, and arrangements stabilise or recompose as components enter and leave. A dyslexic learner with their extensions can in this reading act as a novel form of such an assemblage: reading happens, but it happens in no one place in particular. Read alongside Clark and Chalmers, the logic of assemblage adds what the extended mind underplays, that these couplings are dynamic, political, and constantly remade. Crip technoscience’s account of disabled people’s hacking, tinkering, and remaking of worlds extends this same logic to agency in its fullest form: not something possessed by an individual mind, but something enacted through the assemblage of learner, tool, and community (Hamraie & Fritsch, 2019).
All of these ideas triangulate the same notion: that cognition can extend into digital spaces through technological tools that offload part of our cognitive processing. Where the tool line names the social boundary policing which of these extensions are deemed legitimate, the extended mind tradition dissolves the cognitive boundary altogether. The two arguments work in concert, one describing what minds can do, the other describing what culture permits them to do. This matters for neurodivergent learners, whose neurowiggly cognition can hold extraordinary capacities bottlenecked by the least of their abilities, and it is precisely here that this research finds its opportunity. When external tools and resources can extend cognition, deeply driven by the needs and preferences of the neurodivergent learner, not imposed on them as fixes to deficits–new possibilities unfurl. Learners can turn inward to reflect on themselves and explore new forms of embodiment, cognition, and learning, without having to confront perceived deficits directly or resolve intractable limits of ability. These couplings of interventions vary in closeness. Verbeek (2005, 2011) maps a spectrum of human-technology relations, from tools we consciously point at the world to embodiment and fusion relations, where the boundary between user and tool dissolves. One example is Endel, an app that generates music from weather, time of day, and heart rate to hold a listener in focus. It sits in this state of fusion. When used, you can easily forget you are using a tool at all, making it less tiring for some neurodivergent learners and more likely they will continue to engage over time. I set out to create workshops, materials, and other surfacing experiences in line with the maxim that good design can be invisible (99% Invisible, 2010).
2.5.5How can mind and machine learn from one another?
Cybernetics, originating in the work of Norbert Wiener (1948/2019), describes the study of circular, feedback-driven relationships between systems, and how those systems regulate themselves through communication and control. In the context of this research, cybernetics provides a way of understanding the spiralling, co-learning relationship between neurodivergent learners and the technological systems they use. This is an iterative dialogue where each shapes and is shaped by the other, and it positions this research, and the neurodivergent learners it engages with, inside these systems rather than outside them: not as subjects of the systems that shape their learning, but as interconnected, integrated actors within them, with the capacity to act, adapt, and effect change. N. Katherine Hayles (1999) traces how the boundaries between human and machine have been progressively blurred through the history of cybernetics, arguing that we have always been entangled with our technologies in ways that challenge any clean distinction between the organic and the informatic. Since Harvey Blume (1998) first used the term neurodiversity in print, connections between cybernetics and the neurodiverse experience have been raised. However, an in-depth exploration integrating social models of disability with post-humanist theories remains largely unexamined both socio-culturally and within academic discourse. This research attempts to contribute from a practical perspective to that largely uncharted space.
Hayles’s scholarship helped me explore this space. Her account of cybernetic entanglement is also foundational to post-humanism, the broader ontology within which this research is situated (Braidotti & Hlavajova, 2018). Post-humanism challenges the boundaries of the traditional human subject, embracing the potential for diverse forms of embodiment and cognition to coexist and enrich collective environments; Donna Haraway (1991) was among the first to argue that the boundary between human, animal, and machine had already dissolved in practice, if not yet in theory. New materialist scholarship (Barad, 2007; Braidotti, 2019) extends this further, attending to the agency of non-human actors, materials, and technologies in shaping how we know and act in the world. Alongside these orientations, a connectivist perspective (Siemens, 2005) treats learning as distributed across networks rather than contained within individual minds, a claim developed in the discussion of learning theory earlier in this chapter. Together, these framings support this research’s central claim: that cognition can be extended into digital and material tools without treating that extension as a deficiency to be corrected, but as constituting an expanded, hybrid self, in which the boundary between learner and instrument is negotiable and productive.
The most visible contemporary site of this entanglement is artificial intelligence, and it is worth being precise about its place in this research. AI is treated here as a subset of a wider, evergreen field of emerging and assistive technologies, a lineage running from the first writing, typing, through text-to-speech, spellcheckers, and adaptive human-computer interfaces. Each generation of that field has renegotiated the boundary between mind and machine; AI renegotiates it again, with greater speed, responsiveness, and intimacy. It is plausible that adaptive systems of this kind will become the central medium through which cognitive extension takes place for the next generation of neurodivergent learners, which makes the orientation of those systems a question this research cannot avoid.
A distinction I draw between two design intentions helps navigate this. Productive AI is designed to maximally satiate its user: to auto-complete, to generate, to do the work for you. Didactic AI is designed to create a zone of proximal development with the learner, the space just beyond what they can currently do unaided (Vygotsky, 1978; Luckin & Cukurova, 2019), and to stretch and expand cognition rather than replace it. The distinction matters for this research because a tool that does the thinking for you cannot produce a shift in how you understand your own mind, while a tool that thinks alongside you, adapting to the contours of your cognition, might. Whatever medium these transformations arrive through, the orientation argued for here is humanistic. Emerging technologies earn their place by how far they magnify human intention and preference, never by how much human activity they can absorb.
2.5.6How do you know if a technology flattens variance or encourages flourishing?
The risk of technology flattening variance is a real one. We see this in the way education has been shaped by pathways of technological change, from the printing press to machine-markable standardised tests. There has been a steady encroachment on the personality and outlook of the individual. The filmmaker and critic Adam Curtis (2010) once observed that in our age of individualism we see computers as ways through which we can express our individuality, but the truth is that computers are really good at spotting the very opposite: they can see how similar we are, and from that they can predict what choices and decisions we will make. This infinite scalability and possibility of pre-emptive intervention is a tempting one, and I certainly felt its tug throughout this project.
The cultural and technological historian Lewis Mumford once observed in an interview (Short, 1968) that mechanical collective technology systems can use both punishment and rewards to create compulsive and compliant systems. Carrots rather than sticks, he argues, are the “most dangerous of all the systems of compulsion,” because they would be not just hell but “it would be a worse hell because we wouldn’t realise we were there”. Catherine D’Ignazio and Lauren Klein (2020) extend this critique into the domain of data, showing how data systems encode the biases and power structures of the societies that build them, and how claims of objectivity in technology often serve to obscure rather than challenge existing inequalities.
Against this flattening logic, Nora Bateson’s (2016) concept of warm data offers a different orientation: one that attends to the relational, contextual, and interdependent threads between knowledge rather than reducing experience to isolated, extractable data points. The question for this research is how to use technologies in ways that preserve and amplify the cognitive diversity of neurodivergent learners rather than compressing it into a more manageable shape.
2.5.7How can technology act as the servant and not the master?
Or as Neil Postman (1992) put it, paraphrasing Henry David Thoreau, how can we avoid being a tool of the tools? How can technology be used to truly increase learner agency, autonomy, creative self-expansion, and self-discovery rather than be used as an enormously complex system that induces compliance under cover of claimed individualism? In other words, how can machine systems, interventions, and tools work in concert with you, as the servant and not the master?
Ivan Illich (1973) gave this question its most enduring conceptual frame. Convivial tools, in his account, are those that give each person who uses them the greatest opportunity to enrich the environment with the fruits of their own vision; industrial tools, by contrast, shape their users to the tool’s own logic. The distinction predates the digital age, which is part of its value: it offers a test that travels across every generation of technology this research touches. Navigating contemporary discourse in human-computer interaction, I return constantly to this framing, technologies as the servant and not the master, not guiding events but aiding human intention, improving quality of life according to personal, subjective preferences. Tim Berners-Lee (2025) calls one of the potential interventions data sovereignty, the idea that your digital footprint is yours and you should have control over it rather than it being in the hands of any other actor. In the broader world, this looks like social media companies and tech monopolies accumulating and monetising the data of their users. In the context of this research, it means that the assistive technologies and digital prosthetics we use should work for us in human-centred ways, and carry no ulterior motive: no ads, no upselling, none of the engineered nudging that mature attention-economy technologies (social media feeds, freemium learning apps, recommendation systems) rely on as a business model. This is not a claim that any designed artefact can be neutral. As Winner (1980) and Verbeek (2005) establish earlier in this chapter, every artefact carries politics and shapes the conditions of its use, and an instrument that scaffolds is, in a way, still steering. The distinction that matters is whose ends the steering serves and how legible it is to the person being steered. A convivial tool declares its intent and answers to the learner’s purposes; a nudging system conceals its intent and answers to someone else’s.
D’Ignazio and Klein (2020) argue that building just and accountable data systems requires centring the perspectives of those most affected by them, a principle that maps directly onto the participatory logic of this research. Extending cognition into digital spaces by using technology for the offloading of part of our cognitive processing (Clark, 2001, 2008; Sterelny, 2010) can encourage introspection of the self without seeking to correct perceived deficiency, but rather, embraces the potential for diverse forms of embodiment and cognition to coexist and enrich collective environments (Haraway, 1991).
2.5.8Cognition as Ecology
As we have seen, thinking of cognition as an isolated internal mechanism of the mind contributes to the current limitations of deficit models of education and designed interventions for neurodivergent learners. Extended cognition is not solely about the use of technology or software, rather it argues that our thinking routinely loops through conceptual tools, environments, and other people (Clark & Chalmers, 1998); this framework shaped how I identified what needed shifting in my own practice, and how I approached designing transformative encounters for neurodivergent learners. Extended cognition belongs to a wider family of positions known as 4E cognition, which holds that cognition is embodied in the moving, feeling body; embedded in the environments that scaffold it; enacted through engagement with the world; and extended into the instruments the thinker chooses to connect with (Newen et al., 2018). What these four accounts of cognition all have in common is that they are ecological, a property made up of the arrangement of person, body, place, and external tools rather than of the brain alone. Andy Clark and David Chalmers’ (1998) Extended Mind Thesis puts the coupling precisely: when an external artefact becomes reliably coupled with a person’s thinking processes, it functions as part of their cognitive system rather than a mere aid. In line with post-humanist and crip theory’s refusal to separate mind and body, I use extended cognition rather than extended mind as the theoretical grounding throughout this PhD, treating assistive technologies not as external accommodations but as structural expansions of cognitive capacity itself. If cognition is ecologically assembled, then the qualities education treats as interiorities cannot be entirely independent from these extended contexts. Mindset and autonomy are two such qualities.
A learner’s sense of what is possible for them is informed by what their expanded ecological context has extended to them: a mind offered low friction, accessible extensions learns one story about its capability, and a mind whose extensions are withheld, rationed, or stigmatised learns something else entirely. A deficit mindset, read through the theories of extended cognition, is partly the product of an impoverished or hostile cognitive ecology rather than a private personal failure of belief or imagination. When a mind is capable of extension, but, denied it, a deficit mindset can ensue. This self-perception can be taught early, repeatedly, and with institutional authority.
Autonomy viewed in this way produces an argument for a learner’s right to self-extension by external instruments of cognition, because if my cognition is partly constituted by my extensions, then the freedom to choose those extensions is a fundamental part of my freedom to be a mind at all. Where do mindset and autonomy live? Partly in the water, and only partly in the swimmer.
This understanding of autonomy for neurodivergent learners lays the groundwork of instruments of change, the design vocabulary of this exegesis. If the ecology of extended cognition shapes the mind, the ecology can be designed, and the four instrument categories this research works with reach across the four Es: digital prosthetics extend, mind-body strategies work in embodied and enacted registers, space-making tends to what cognition is embedded in, and relational practices distribute thinking across people.
See the creative artefactThe four instruments of change
Digital prosthetics, mind-body strategies, relational practices and space-making: the four directions a learner's instruments of change can take, and the four rooms of the database.
2.5.9What are instruments of change?
The preceding sections have moved from the tool line, through extended cognition and assemblages, to the question of what a technology owes its user. One more piece of vocabulary is needed before this exegesis turns to practice, and it is the central one: instruments of change. This research uses the term as an umbrella for the entire range of interventions that can support a neurodivergent learner, mapped across four directions. Digital prosthetics are individual stacks of hardware and software (spelling and grammar checkers, timers and planners, dictation and notetaking software) that modify and extend cognition; the term is deliberately invoked to reframe assistive technology from a deficit-marker to a legitimate ability extension. Mind-body strategies concern metacognition, awareness of needs, and the positioning of emotion so that the learner is in a state of openness. Relational practices enable collective reflection, co-discovery, and the joy of finding yourself surprised by how differently others think. Space-making addresses the direct environment: light, soundscape, temperature, sensory design, and the rigid or flexible pedagogical structures a space enforces. These instruments are not siloed domains but act in concert, like an orchestra, producing effects together that none could achieve alone.
The vocabulary sits deliberately between two established frames. Clark and Chalmers’ (1998) extended mind, discussed above, primarily addresses individual couplings of tool and mind; it dissolves a boundary without taxonomising the kinds of support that cross it. Urie Bronfenbrenner’s (1979/2009) bioecological model organises context into environmental layers, but it cuts along settings rather than modalities of support. Instruments of change cut the other way. They name what can be picked up, practised, and deployed, by a learner or with them, across any of those layers. Illich’s convivial test applies to all four directions equally, and so does the tool line, since a breathing exercise or a quiet corner can be policed as readily as a spellchecker.
I have tried to move to the language of instruments rather than tools. Tim Ingold (2000) describes skilled practice as a process in which the tool is incorporated into the body’s way of attending to the world: a violin is not used so much as played, and the playing changes the player. An instrument, in this sense, is something you learn, something that produces music in concert with others, something that develops intimacy over time. Where a tool extends a capacity, an instrument reshapes the learner’s relationship to that capacity. How this language emerged from the practice, and what it took to unlearn a tool-first framing is told in Chapter 4. Between the survival of full compliance and the exposure of outright refusal, this work pursues a third way. Extending the social model, Carol Thomas’s (1999, 2007) feminist and relational approach recognises that impairment effects and psycho-emotional disablism deeply shape a person’s day-to-day mode of being. Responding to these intertwined physical and emotional realities, an open mindset and frequent use of instruments of change can assemble what I think of as an intermediary agent: a chosen, configurable layer of technology, community, and environment that sits between, and conforms around, a learner’s cognition and the demands of the world, much as a boundary object sits between different communities’ ways of knowing (Star & Griesemer, 1989). With that layer in place, the worst vicissitudes of life no longer fall on your mind alone to manage. Navigating external demands shifts from an unmediated condition of survival to an agential decision, where learner and world are helped into a generative relation with one another.
The vocabulary this exegesis has assembled can now be gathered in one place, from the widest claim to the most concrete instance.
| Term | What it names | How I use it |
|---|---|---|
| Extended cognition | The theoretical position: thinking loops through tools, environments, bodies, and other people (Clark & Chalmers, 1998; Newen et al., 2018) | The umbrella claim the rest of the vocabulary operationalises |
| Instruments of change | This exegesis’s organising framework: the full range of supports a learner can adopt to extend cognition | Four directions: digital prosthetics, mind-body strategies, relational practices, space-making |
| Digital prosthetics | Technological artefacts that modify or extend cognitive capacities | One direction among the four; the founding idea this research began with |
| Extensions | Categories of support directed at a component of everyday learning (note capture, time sensing, reading by ear) | The middle layer of the neurodiversity.tools ontology; each extension gathers tools and strategies |
| Tools | Specific software, objects, or techniques, wielded for a purpose chosen by their user (Illich, 1973) | The concrete instances; a tool extends a capacity |
| Strategies | The underlying methods one or more tools employ (the Pomodoro Technique beneath a timing app) | What survives when a specific tool is swapped out |
| Instrument, as against tool | A support the learner corresponds with over time, reshaping their relationship to the capacity itself (Ingold, 2000) | Tools become instruments through practice and intimacy; the relational register this exegesis prefers |
2.6Design, Creativity & Play
2.6.1What kind of design is this research doing?
This research is perhaps best described as practice-informed participatory co-learning design. I, as a designer and a neurodivergent one at that, apply my experiences and sensibilities to create experiences and objects that dovetail into spaces I facilitate and lead. In these spaces I try to learn with my participants: I respond to what they are saying, I adapt to their critique, and I do not try to defend the choices I have made that do not work for them. I learn with them, to emerge in second and third attempts more closely aligned with what their needs actually are. Where collective sense-making, participatory design, and collaborative creativity did occur, I tried to grasp it, often through group reflection at the end of workshops and through constant, continued re-engagement with my participants over multiple sessions.
Linda Candy (2006) distinguishes practice-based research, in which a creative artefact is itself the basis of the contribution to knowledge, from practice-led research, which leads primarily to new understandings about the nature of practice. Christopher Frayling’s (1993) earlier taxonomy of research into, through, and for design maps similar territory. Michael Biggs (2002) sharpens the stakes of these labels, arguing that the presence of practice does not by itself constitute research: an artefact can carry part of an answer, but only the surrounding argument makes that answer communicable and transferable. Cameron Tonkinwise (2014a, 2014b) adds that design can be a mode of inquiry that generates knowledge through its own processes of making, prototyping and intervening, rather than borrowing its legitimacy from adjacent disciplines.
This research is practice-informed: the workshops and creative outputs are instruments of the inquiry and evidence within it, informing and testing the theoretical claims, while the contribution is carried by the written argument and the outputs together rather than residing in an artefact alone. Participatory marks that the people the research concerns shaped its course; co-learning names the kind of environment the workshops created, one in which participants and facilitator generate knowledge together.
The collectivist impulses of this work sit within a tradition of design practice that has shifted, over the last several decades, from designing for people to designing with them. Pelle Ehn’s (1988) early participatory design work in Scandinavian workplaces tied that shift to a democratic principle, a history Simonsen and Robertson (2012) trace and revised in a contemporary account (Smith et al., 2025): the people whose lives a designed system will change hold a right to shape it. Elizabeth Sanders and Pieter Jan Stappers (2008) describe co-design as collective creativity applied across the whole span of a design process, a move that repositions the people who will use, inhabit, or be affected by a design as active participants in its creation rather than passive subjects of it. Sasha Costanza-Chock (2020) extends this into a justice-oriented frame through the Design Justice Network, arguing that design should be led by the communities most affected by its outcomes and that the process of design itself, not just what it produces, is a site of power. Light and Akama (2012) ground this lineage in the body of the facilitator: participation, they argue, is enacted through the situated, improvisational touch of the person holding the space, however well designed the methods. This research holds onto that democratic commitment while proposing a distinction between co-design and co-engagement.
There are five operative co-design principles that have been taken up in this research. Participants are treated as the experts of their own experience, and the content of the workshops bends to what they surface. Mutual learning, Ehn’s (1988) founding principle, is built into the facilitation: I learn the participants’ worlds while they learn the instruments I bring. Creative initiative is distributed across the span of the encounter rather than reserved for a single generative phase, in Sanders and Stappers’ (2008) sense. Iteration happens with the same people over multiple sessions, so that critique in one workshop visibly reshapes the next. Finally, decision-making is made transparent: participants see what was designed for them, and why, and are invited to redirect it.
Tone Bratteteig and Ina Wagner (2012, 2014) argue that participation is, axiomatically, a matter of shared decision-making, and they trace how influence concentrates wherever decisions are made out of view. Making the decision points visible is what converts involvement into influence. John Vines and colleagues (2013) extend the argument to the configuration of participation itself, where researchers decide how people get to participate, and disclosing that configuration, rather than presenting it as natural, is part of treating participants as partners in the process. Lucy Suchman (2002) gives the position its genealogy in located accountability: design knowledge is always produced from somewhere, and naming the somewhere is a condition of honest relations.
For neurodivergent participants a pedagogy whose rationale is withheld repeats the structure of the assessments and interventions many neurodivergent learners have already endured, while a legible scaffold, one whose purpose can be seen and questioned, lowers the suspicion that something is being done to you and turns the design itself into material participants can redirect. Chapter 4 returns to this at the moment in practice where a participant saw the scaffold of an exercise and anticipated its next move.
A commitment to participant agency and collective engagement carries a complication. Katta Spiel and Kathrin Gerling (2021) found that play and design research involving neurodivergent populations is overwhelmingly top-down and driven by extrinsic goals, which makes the design justice demand to centre neurodivergent voices urgent (Costanza-Chock, 2020). At the same time, the cognitive and executive demands of full participatory engagement can be exclusionary in their own right: some forms of collaborative design place the intellectual labour of resolving design questions on participants, labour that many neurodivergent learners cannot take on while they are acutely struggling. There is a tension between these two positions, and this research sits with it through a methodological stance I name co-engagement, defined in Chapter 3.
This is also why I hold the language of co-design with caution. I am wary of what my supervisor Lisa Grocott calls “faux design”: the declaration of using co-design principles, collective creativity in Sanders and Stappers’ sense, without applying them fully. Over this project I have had to consider how my community of care may or may not have capacity to engage in the labour of co-design, and I do not think all the work I have done here is co-design. Naming that plainly seems more honest than borrowing the term’s legitimacy.
Inside the disciplinary bounds of design research, the affordances and constraints of designed objects are often viewed as independent from the affordances and constraints of the cognition of the user (Norman, 1998). The tool line, discussed in the previous section, shows the same separation from the other side. What an object affords depends on which user, and which uses, the culture around it is prepared to legitimise. Inclusive and critical design traditions refuse this separation. They treat the object and the cognition of its user as one coupled system, which makes it possible to design deliberately for particular minds: amplifying what a specific pairing of learner and tool affords, and removing the constraints that make a tool ineffective for that learner. There is a WonderLab lineage of design research praxis (Grocott, 2022; Tuckwell, 2020), where the act of designing is understood not as the application of a solution but as a mode of inquiry, a way of asking questions through making. Designed materials carry tacit knowing of their own (Polanyi, 1966; Cross, 1982), which is part of why made things count as knowledge in that lineage. I believe this is also happening here.
2.6.2Why does this research critique affirmatively?
There is plenty of critique embedded within this research, and very little of it takes the form of a directed attack on existing structures. The position taken here is that an effective critique of one paradigm is to populate the logic of a countervailing line of inquiry: by existing as a generative centre of knowledge, such work operates propositionally rather than oppositionally.
Critique, Bruno Latour (2004) argued, has run out of steam: the deconstructive gesture keeps revealing what lies beneath yet assembles nothing in its place, and its habits of suspicion have proven portable, borrowed with ease by climate sceptics and conspiracy theorists. His remedy redirects attention from matters of fact to matters of concern, the things people gather around because they care about them and recasts the critic as “the one who assembles”, the one who “offers the participants arenas in which to gather” (Latour, 2004, p. 246). To call something constructed, on this reading, is to recognise it as fragile and in need of care and caution. Critique becomes a practice of adding materially to the world rather than subtracting from it.
Braidotti (2006, 2019) gives this orientation its ethics. Her affirmative ethics, rooted in Deleuze’s account of affirmation (Deleuze, 1994), treats affirmation as the activation of transformative and critical thinking, a way of working with what a situation makes possible. This is a different sense of “affirmative” from Dunne and Raby’s (2013) pejorative use of “affirmative design,” design that reinforces the status quo; here, affirmation is generative and propositional rather than complacent. Manning (2016) carries the orientation into the texture of practice through the minor gesture. The minor, for Manning, is the variation that runs inside every major form, and a minor gesture is a small, relational act that shifts the field of what can be felt and done without waiting for the authority of a major institutional intervention. A workshop exercise that lets a learner reframe their own cognition is a minor gesture in exactly this sense: it alters the relations in the room, and the alteration travels.
Michalinos Zembylas (2022) brings affirmative critique into educational settings, discussing how negative critique now shares its gestures of unmasking and debunking with post-truth suspicion, so intensifying exposure feeds the cynicism it sets out to counter. Drawing on Foucault and Butler to treat critique as a practice rather than a verdict, he argues for pedagogies that engage learners’ attachments, build capacities and generate alternatives. This is important for this PhD, as a deficit story a learner holds about their own cognition shifts when a more liveable account becomes available to think and act with, and correction and critique alone rarely supplies one.
Shari Daya (2025) turns the same attention onto academic practice itself. Of the positions assembled in this section, hers is the one this research aligns with most completely. The prevailing culture of critique, she argues, operates from a deficit model: reading for the flaw, rewarding the takedown, mistaking severity for rigour. She calls for a changed culture oriented towards context, creativity and care, critique that is situated in the circumstances of the work, alive to what it is attempting, and invested in its flourishing. Her diagnosis of academic critique and this exegesis’s suggestion of how neurodivergent cognition has been described are the similar lines of thinking at different scales and contexts, a trained habit of reading for deficit that forecloses what a piece of work, or a person, might be capable of. Encountering her paper was an experience of recognition for me, naming the value of a care-full, situated and creative critique. This research is committed to enacting a form of critique that is generative, propositional, and capable of producing new configurations of knowledge: the ultimate affirmative critique is demonstrating that researching with neurodivergent learners produces richer, more impactful knowledge, exposing the limitations of systemic exclusion simply by modelling a more effective alternative.
An exegesis that argues for strengths-based readings of neurodivergent cognition cannot be coherently prosecuted through a deficit-based critique. An affirmative, at times celebratory, critique approaches knowledge production the way strengths-based practice approaches learners, beginning with existing capacities, working with what is present, and trusting that accounts and discourses can be improved when offered something better to think with. What this research refuses is the claim to universality: quantitative, structuralist frameworks devised without neurodivergent learners have too often presented themselves as the whole of legitimate knowledge about neurodivergent minds.
Each Neuroformer workshop was an arena (Latour, 2004), gathered around a matter of concern, the participants’ own cognition, in which learners, facilitators and instruments of change could produce knowledge together. The pedagogy Zembylas argues for happened at this scale, in sessions that worked with learners’ existing attachments to their diagnoses and their tools and built from them.
See the creative artefactThe Neuroformer Workshop Series

Three workshops with neurodivergent young people at Youth Inc in Adelaide, where both communities met; the materials are photographed on the outputs page.
This line of logic developed through supervision conversations with Isa Brandalise, whose own doctoral research practises affirmative critique from inside entrenched institutional structures (Brandalise, 2024). Isa works through what she calls “prefigurative instantiations”: embodied alternatives, enacted within a system, that open precedents and point to possibilities the system already contains (2024, p. 128). Her position is “non-escapist yet self-critical” (2024, p. 24); where withdrawal or refusal might be expected, she showcases unexpected options instead. The workshop series was prefigurative in the same way, with each session modelling the inside of reimagined future versions of educational structures, a way of engaging neurodivergent cognition that the surrounding system had not yet made space for.
2.6.3Why does this research require a pluriversal rather than universal design approach?
Universal Design for Learning, developed by CAST and articulated by Meyer, Rose and Gordon (2014), proposes a framework of multiple means of engagement, representation, and action to create learning environments accessible to the widest possible range of learners, shifting design from individual accommodation to proactive flexibility. It offers a centralised frame, arguing that it is possible to create a sufficiently expansive output that can assist people across a spectrum of users. This is a tantalising goal; after all, only one system would need to be devised to assist all users in their wide and multifaceted variance.
The challenge to this thinking, particularly in the context of working with neurodivergent communities, is that needs are sometimes not just varied but antithetical to one another. In its most extreme form, the visually impaired user needs the exact opposite of the deaf user. This fundamental incompatibility does not always surface immediately while using universal design as a methodology, but nevertheless it can introduce necessary tensions, accidentally marginalise individuals who still fail to meet this wider norm, or prioritise new perceived norms rather than create psychologically safe spaces for inquiry (Baglieri, 2020; Hamilton & Petty, 2023). While universal design offers utility in broad contexts, it often lacks the nuance required for deep, individualised introspection and transformation. Recent evidence supports this: even well-designed UDL interventions differentially benefit students depending on their neurodivergent characteristics, pointing to a need for more tailored support within inclusive frameworks (Taylor et al., 2025).
Arturo Escobar’s (2017) concept of the pluriverse, a world where many worlds fit, offers an alternative orientation for design: one that does not centre on one place but rather in many places, responding to each person or context, morphing to react to constantly emerging needs. Escobar (2017) argues for radical interdependence and autonomy, channelling design’s world-making capacity towards ways of being and doing that are deeply attuned to the communities they serve. Pluriversal approaches assume differences from the start. Of course everyone is different, and it naturally follows that we must be responsive down to the level of the individual. What a joy that realisation is. That to me, the most fun, meaningful, direct form of engagement is perhaps the only space where we can create effective and lasting interventions for the neurodivergent community.
Without containing the whole, the idea of any grand unifying theory seems at least in some way to be reductive, compressing an uncapped kaleidoscope of divergencies into a bounded set. It is worth adding here that this set is, thankfully, greater than the single point we have seen so much before, where any needs that spread away in any direction from the norm were swept up and deposited in a bin of non-engagement. Nevertheless, starting from a constrained theory of change causes havoc on working toward the final goal of transformative change. The core logic of this research challenges the static nature of traditional educational environments, invoking the metaphor of the adjustable seat. Standardised pedagogical environments, much like static furniture, fail to conform to the individual, forcing the learner to contort themselves to fit the institution. We can move beyond an unnuanced critique of universality toward a model of pluriversal adaptability. This pluriversal adaptability is what shapes the modular, non-prescriptive structure of the Neurodiversity Playbook itself.
See the creative artefactThe Neurodiversity Playbook

Exercises, materials and a workshop builder for the community of care, structured by SEAT.
2.6.4What role does play serve in this work?
Play is used in this research in two distinct but interrelated ways. The first is play as an end in itself, valued intrinsically for the experience it offers, in the workshops this approach appears in signposted ‘play interludes’ without any pedagogical motive aside from reinforcing a playful sensibility across the length of the encounter. There is a rich tradition of play scholarship, from Gregory Bateson’s (1955) foundational work on play and fantasy, which argues that play creates a frame within which actions carry different meanings than they would outside it, through to the contemporary Danish play research tradition at Design School Kolding. Helle Marie Skovbjerg’s (2021) mood perspective on play provides a language for understanding this. Skovbjerg distinguishes between play media (what you play with), play practices (what you do), and play moods (the feeling of involvement you experience). From this perspective, good play is play that goes on and on because it makes sense to those who are playing. There is no external metric by which it is judged.
See the creative artefactPlay interludes
Play between the exercises: fast bursts that shift the room's register, and quieter interludes that let it settle.
Skovbjerg and Anne-Lene Sand (2022) frame Scandinavian approaches to play as intrinsically valuable. The same case is made loudly within play practice itself: at CounterPlay, the international play festival founded by Mathias Poulsen, whose 2026 edition I attended in the course of this research, the recurring argument runs against the instrumentalisation and rationalisation of play, insisting that play is of value in itself because it is fundamentally bonded to human life. Sune Gudiksen and Skovbjerg (2020) extend this into a practical guide for designers, showing how the phenomenal characteristics and potentials found in strong play experiences can be engaged across learning, innovation, and design contexts. Mathias Poulsen (2022) explores the deep kinship between play and democracy, arguing that play is a powerful tool for societal change and transformation. A. S. Neill (1960), who founded the progressive democratic school in Suffolk, UK, Summerhill, took a similar position decades earlier: that the aim of life is to find happiness, which means to find interest, and that education should be a preparation for life rather than an exercise in conformity.
The second way play is used is more instrumental: as a means to an end, positioning learners in a particular state, playfulness, and creating psychological scaffolding and safety. Miguel Sicart (2014) is useful here: playfulness, in his account, is an attitude that can be brought to bear on any activity, separable from the formal structures of games. Playfulness in this mode can aid the cultivation of an open mindset, broadening attention and building the resources from which openness draws (Fredrickson, 2001), lowering the stakes of experimentation, and creating the conditions under which learners feel willing to take risks with how they think about themselves. Skovbjerg’s (2021) play moods are useful here too: the mood of devotion, of being absorbed and present, can be designed for. It is not guaranteed, but the conditions that invite it can be created through careful attention to materials, pacing, and tone.
The politics of play is the decision, or not, to instrumentalise it. Brian Sutton-Smith (1997) names this the central ambiguity of play scholarship: the rhetoric of play as developmental progress sits in permanent tension with play as an intrinsic good. To use play as a way to achieve educational or learning outcomes is to place it in service of something beyond itself. There is a risk in this: that play becomes merely a delivery mechanism for content, losing the very qualities that make it transformative. There is also a risk in refusing instrumentalisation entirely, because it can leave playful methods out of educational contexts that would benefit from them.
For ADHD, the stakes of this politics are unusually high. Jaak Panksepp (1998) argued that rising ADHD diagnoses and the routine prescription of psychostimulants may partly reflect an institutional intolerance of childhood playfulness: classrooms with shrinking room for rough-and-tumble play recast playful, high-energy behaviour as symptom, then medicate the behaviour rather than restore the play. He suggested the causality may run the other way entirely, that abundant physical play is one of the ways young brains learn to regulate impulse, and asked whether suppressing it amounts to a tragedy in the making. Read through the social model, the deficit sits in the environment’s tolerance of playfulness, and a pedagogy that designs playfulness back in is meeting a need rather than indulging a distraction. This research tries to hold both orientations of play in tension, creating spaces where play is valued for its own sake while also recognising that playful encounters can scaffold the kinds of mindset shifts that neurodivergent learners need in order to engage with new tools, new strategies, and new ways of thinking about themselves.
2.6.5What is the value of delight?
Creativity, magic and playfulness are all approaches in pursuit of the sensation of delight and, more broadly, positive affect, the term psychology gives to the felt, embodied quality of emotional experience. I use the term deliberately, because for the learners this research serves the felt quality of a learning encounter is rarely incidental. Throughout this work I have come into contact, both overtly and indirectly, with critiques of prevailing educational norms, systems, and theory. In the workshops at the heart of this research, I met neurodivergent learners who described their education as friction, failure, and a steady erosion of self-belief. For learners carrying that history, encounters that are genuinely enjoyable might be a precondition for openness. If educators want learners to be willing to experiment with new tools, to reimagine their relationship to their own cognition, and to take the risks that transformation requires, my working assumption is that we must first create spaces where they want to be. The question that follows from all of this, from the theories of learning, the technologies of extension, and the designed environments of play, is: what does it mean to fold all of this into a creative practice?
2.7Conclusion
This chapter has assembled a confluence of ideas from disability studies, learning theory, cybernetics, extended cognition, design, and play. The theory assembled in this chapter is not a foundation laid before the building begins. It is the ocean through which the dolphin dives, gaining depth and momentum, before rising into the air of practice to reorient and to see more clearly. What follows in the next chapters is the practice itself: how I applied these concepts in practice, how I observed them emerge and play out in the room, what that made possible, and what those encounters taught me in return.
Interlude beginsInterlude 3: Vigil, George Saunders
‘An inevitable occurrence, upon which, therefore, it would be impossible, even ludicrous, to pass judgment.
Who else could he have been, but who he was?’
George Saunders’ novel Vigil (2026)
Interlude ends